We show how changes in the educational composition of the labour force affect both the level and the behaviour over time of aggregate unemployment series. We also demonstrate that if it had not been for such changes, the U.S. unemployment series would look "European" since the within-group unemployment series all have that same appearance. We derive a natural-rate model of unemployment for two education groups, providing microfoundations for inter-group differences in wages and unemployment, and evaluate its plausibility in light of microeconomic evidence.
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The topic of this volume is the dynamic behaviour of unemployment-rate series. In particular, we are interested in knowing what causes unemployment persistence that could explain differences in average unemployment across decades and countries. In this paper we draw attention to the role played by changes in the composition of the labour force across education groups.
When labour-market shocks affect the relative fortunes of different education groups (wages or employment), the speed at which labour supply responds by moving towards the high wages/low unemployment groups affects the dynamic properties of unemployment. We note that this adjustment can be fairly long, measured in halfdecades or even decades as schooling takes a number of years to complete. For this reason, we find it difficult to draw conclusions about the nature or causes of unemployment persistence without looking at both changes in the within-group unemployment rates and changes in the relative size of the different groups.
We contend that differences across countries in the speed of adjustment can explain some of the differences in the pattern of (total) unemployment dynamics.
1 In Section I we take a look at unemployment and the composition of the labour force in the U.S.
and show how looking only at the overall unemployment rate masks similarities with many of the high-unemployment European countries.
Of course, we are not the first ones to look at within-group unemployment rates.
The notion of mismatch between the pattern of the labour force and the pattern of employment has taken centre stage in many studies of unemployment. However, a weakness in this literature is the lack of robust microfoundations for inter-group unemployment differentials. In Layard et al. (1991) , intra-group unemployment rates are a function of a wage-push parameter, and in the short run the relative size of the groups. They assume the existence of a wage curve that includes this wage-push parameter. This parameter is assumed to be a positive function of the rate of turnover.
With higher turnover among the less educated, unions can afford to be more aggressive because the expected duration of unemployment is shorter at any given rate of unemployment. If wage push is stronger among the less educated, causing the rate 1 Cohen, Lefranc and Saint-Paul (1997) find that the within-group unemployment rates for different education groups are roughly the same in France and the U.S. while the share of the labour force belonging to the lowest groups is higher in France. We think that the latter could go a long way in explaining the higher aggregate unemployment rate in France.
of return to education to be lower than the rate of interest, their unemployment rises until the expected return to education becomes equal to the required return.
A shortcoming of this work is the absence of any modelling of high turnover and the link to the wage-push parameter. Few attempts have been made at explicitly modelling differences in unemployment and equilibrium wages across groups using either efficiency-wage models or bargaining models. 2 This brings us to the second contribution of this paper. We write down a model that explains unemployment-and wage differentials across groups working in the same firm. This amounts to providing microfoundations for the wage curve assumed by Layard et al. and also microfoundations for differences in the rate of inflow into unemployment across worker-types. This clears the way to providing an explanation for changes over time in the rate of unemployment for different education groups.
We begin by showing that were it not for a rapidly changing composition of the labour force, the U.S. unemployment series would have a distinct European look. In Section II we move on to modelling inter-group differences in equilibrium unemployment and wages and look for empirical evidence for different parameter values. We conclude by looking at possible reasons for recent developments in the evolution of unemployment and wages by education group.
I Changes in the Composition of Unemployment
The number of workers in the U.S. with less than a high-school education has fallen drastically in recent decades. We contend that this may be one reason why the total unemployment series does not show the same level of persistence as observed in
Europe. The share of the labour force belonging to the different education groups is shown in Chart 1. The share of the lowest group, the high-school dropouts, fell from 34.5% in 1971 to only 10.8% in 1996. The share of those with some college education rose from 12.3% to 27.8% and the share of those with a college degree went from 14.8% to 28.3%.
[ CHART 1]
The corresponding unemployment rates are shown in Chart 2. All education groups share a distinctively "European" look: the rates rose in infrequent jumps (mid 1970´s and early 1980´s) between 1970 and 1996 for each of the four groups. As in Europe, the within-group unemployment rates failed to recover fully following these two large recessions. The rise is largest among those with less than high-school educationfrom 4.6% in 1970 to 10.8% in 1996. But the unemployment rate for those who completed high school went from 2.9% to 5.3%, for those with some college from 2.9% to 4.0%
and, finally, for college graduates from 1.3% to 2.2%.
[CHART 2]
The question arises how the average rate of unemployment could have avoided the same kind of a rise since it was about the same in 1996 (4.7%) as in 1971 (4.5%).
We argue that the democratisation of high school education, and increasingly that of college as well, holds the answer. The effect of this upgrading can be seen in Chart 3, which has the actual unemployment rate and a constructed rate that holds the weights fixed at their 1965 level. We see that the unemployment rate would have been 2.5%
higher had it not been for the democratisation of educational opportunities. 4 We conclude that the within-group unemployment rates look "European" and that the overall unemployment rate has, if one ignores the effect of the educational upgrading, a similar pattern to what we see in many European countries. This puts a new light on the presumption of labour-market flexibility in the U.S. Of course, if the composition of the labour force responds rapidly to changes in relative unemployment/wages, this is a form of flexibility. However, the absence of labourmarket regulations and other rigidities may not be implied.
[CHART 3]
Before concluding that the educational composition of the labour force 4 The fall in the proportion of workers with less than a high-school diploma in the period 1910-1940, (which has been documented by Goldin and Katz (1997) ) differs from the same development in the post-war years. The mass movement toward completing high school in the U.S. in the inter-war period was more like the mass tendency of people to acquire "some college and possibly a degree" in the years since World War II.
constitutes and independent determinant of the natural rate of unemployment, we need to test whether the within-group unemployment rates are independent of the size of the relevant group. It is possible that when the best workers leave one group for another, they raise the unemployment rates in both groups as the average quality of workers has fallen in both groups. We find that this is not so by testing for an effect of group size on the within-group unemployment rates (see appendix).
But has the same development not taken place in Europe? We have looked at data for Germany, France and Italy (see Phelps and Zoega, 1996) Workers with a university degree and those with apprenticeship training also experienced rising unemployment while the good performance of those with vocational training is noticeable. We calculate that the educational upgrading had not taken place, unemployment would have been 1.2% higher in 1994, which is a small difference given the high rates experienced in past years.
II A Model of the Natural Rate with two Types of Labour
Changes in the educational composition of the labour force could only be of interest if equilibrium unemployment differed between the groups. We mentioned the work of Layard et al. (1991) , Lazear (1989) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) above. In an earlier paper (Orszag and Zoega, 1996) , we show using an incentive-wage model of the quitting variety (the so-called turnover-training model of Phelps (1994) ) that workers in industries where productivity is expected to grow should ceteris paribus receive higher wages. Retaining them is more important to firms in light of the expected 5 We are grateful to Elmar Honekopp for providing the German data.
improvement in their productivity and this justifies higher wages. However, this does not explain differences in wages across heterogeneous workers in the same industry unless expected productivity growth is non-neutral across education-or skill groups within firms.
In this paper we again use the turnover-training model, this time to explain inter-group differences in wages and unemployment within firms. For present purposes, we have added two features. There are workers with high education, L 1 in number, and workers with low education, L 2 , and they work together at firms. This enables us to model the determinants of unemployment differences across two groups of workers. Second, firms use their wage policy to affect the rate of hiring in addition to the quit-rate. As a result, the level of wages becomes the only control variable used to affect hires and quits.
II.1 Theory
The model treats the employee as a capital asset, a treatment that originated with Slichter (1957) and Oi (1962) . Firms invest in the firm-specific training of new employees and use their (relative) wage policy to retain trained workers. Both the training-and the wage-setting decision are intertemporal investment decisions.
Investing in the retention of current employees is no less important than training newcomers. In so doing, unemployment is created which in equilibrium acts to deter quitting and makes firms content not to raise wages.
The production technology is the following:
and the hire rate, h i .
The firm makes its wage decision in order to attract new workers and to discourage existing workers from quitting. Both the hire rate, h i , and the quit rate, q i , are a function of the ratio of wages to the expected wage (and non-wage) income obtainable elsewhere after quitting. We take the hire rate to measure the rate of inflow of workers who pass the grade as sufficiently qualifiedwithin their education groupto perform the tasks required of them. The hire-and quit-rate equations follow:
Here w i is the wage paid to workers of group i, w i e is the average wage for group i in the economy, ( ) where u i is the rate of unemployment. 6 We have also solved the model by assuming that the better educated train both themselves and the less educated. This does not affect our conclusions.
We use Ψ to measure labour-market tightness. The labour market can be tight because the rate of employment is high and/or the unemployment-benefit replacement ratio is high. Both raise the expected income of the unemployed and hence raise (reduce) the incentive to quit (get a job).
The representative firm's profit maximisation decision is described by the following Bellman equation;
where ρ is the real rate of interest and V is expected discounted profits for the representative firmthe value of the firm. Note that there are two state variables; E 1 and E 2 .
The wage-setting decision is an intertemporal investment decision. By raising wages, firms invest in retaining and recruiting workers that embody the ( 
The left-hand side has the marginal cost and the right-hand side the marginal benefit from raising wages. The first term on the left-hand side is the rise in costs due to higher wages and the second is the increase in training costs caused by greater recruitment.
The right-hand side has the marginal benefit in terms of a larger workforce due to both more recruitment and fewer quits. Simplifying and taking into account that in equilibrium we have w w e 1 1 = , gives the optimal wage for the more educated workers:
We note that the wage is higher the more valuable is the marginal worker and the more effective are wages in retaining (β i ) and recruiting (b i ) workers. Now solving for the wage for the less educated workers, w 2 , gives:
The economic interpretation is the same as in equation (6) 
Substituting (7) and (9) into the Bellman equation (5) and using the boundary conditions,
gives the value of the firm in a stationary state: h 1 = q 1 and h 2 = q 2 .
From equations (7), (9) and (10) we see that the wages are a decreasing function of the rate of turnover that is in steady state measured by a i . Higher turnover reduces the time workers can devote to producing and hence reduces the value of each worker to the firm. Moreover, equations (7) and (9) tell us that the higher is turnover, the greater is the marginal cost of recruiting new workers through high wages due to increasing marginal training costs. These two effects make wages a decreasing function of turnover. This result goes against that of the Layard et al. (1991) model described in the introduction. However, the effect on employment will turn out to be the same.
Wages are also declining in the cost of training measured by either µ i or c i . This should be clear from the preceding discussion. When costs of training increase, this raises the marginal cost of raising wages as training any new recruit is bound to be more expensive. Each employed worker is also worth less in light of the effort she has to expand in training newcomers.
Finally, we get an expression for steady-state employment in equilibrium (when w = w e ) for both the less educated and the better educated. This is the value of 1 -u i that makes the flows into and out of employment cancel for a given level of the replacement ratio:
. The labour market can be tightΨ have a high valueif either the rate of employment (1-u) is high and/or the replacement ratio r takes a high value.
The steady state can be shown as in the figure below.
[ Figure] The top half of the figure has the determination of the steady state in equation (11).
Hires are a decreasing function of labour-market tightness Ψ and quits are an increasing function of this variable. Steady state corresponds to only one level of Ψ, which is the one that makes hires equal to quits and is described in the equation. This makes a given level of Ψ correspond to a higher rate of unemployment in steady state.
We note that the replacement ratio changes not only when unemployment benefits are raised, but also when equilibrium wagessee equations (7) and (9)are changed. We can now write down the determinants of the natural rate of unemployment for each group.
A rise in the replacement ratio, caused by a fall in wages or a rise in benefits, tilts the tightness curve to the right causing increased tightness at the same level of unemployment, and hence quits to go up and hires to go down. This makes unemployment rise and tightness fall until the steady-state value of Ψ is attained again at a higher rate of unemployment. This corresponds to a movement up the tilted tightness curve and to the left. If we think of the less educated as having a higher replacement ratio, this translates into a steeper tightness curve and steady state is attained at a higher level of unemploymenteach percentage point of unemployment affects quits and hires less since the ratio of benefits to wages is higher.
We can now claim that anything which affects the level of equilibrium wages in equations (7) and (9) also affects the replacement ratioassuming benefits have a fixed leveland so also the slope of the tightness curve and steady-state unemployment. When explaining differences in unemployment by education, two factors come to mind. Wages (the replacement ratio) are decreasing (increasing) in µ i  the marginal training cost and in the rate of turnover measured in steady state by the parameter a i . This assumes that a and α move in tandem so the level of steady-state Ψ is not affected. A rise in either the marginal training costs or the turnover rate raises unemployment by reducing wages (for reasons explained above), hence acting to raise quits and to reduce hiring at the initial level of unemployment through a higher replacement ratio. So if it costs more to train the less educated (either because they are less adaptablehave a higher µ and cor because their turnover is higherthey have a higher a and α), firms are going to offer lower wages. This will necessitate a higher rate of unemployment in order to attain the steady-state tightness level, Ψ*.
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Turning the attention to the top half of our figure, the difference between a i and α i affects the level of steady-state tightness Ψ* and hence the equilibrium unemployment rate. The greater is the difference between the two parameters the higher is the steady-state level of Ψ. If the autonomous hire rate is much larger than the autonomous quit rate, the labour market has to be really tightΨ has to be largefor quits to match the flow out of unemployment. The high level of Ψ then translates through the tightness curve into a high level of employment for a given replacement ratio. While this could help explain differences in unemployment rates across education groups, we have no prior as to the sign of the effect.
Finally, the slope of the hire-and the quit functions affects steady-state tightness but also the level of wages. A rise in either b i or β i makes the two curves steeper and gives a lower level of Ψ*because any given level of employment has a greater inducement effect in recruiting and a greater deterrent effect on quitting. But now that quits and hires are more sensitive to changes in wages, the equilibrium level of wages rises as seen in equations (7) and (9) giving a lower replacement ratio. This reduces the slope of the tightness curve and leads to a fall in unemployment for a given level of Ψ*. The net effect is ambiguous. Again we have no prior as to the sign of this effect in explaining differences in unemployment across education groups.
II.2 Microevidence on the Parameters
Empirically, the rate of unemployment among the less educated is higher. This can be seen in the table below.
Using our model, we can explain this pattern by postulating that either i) the cost of training the less educated is higher than that for the better educated, µ 1 < µ 2 and c 1 < c 2 . ii) the rate of turnover is higher for the less educated, a 1 < a 2 and α 1 < α 2 or the difference between their autonomous quit-and hire rate (α -a) larger or, finally, iii) the more educated respond differently to wage incentives; b 1 not equal to b 2 and β 1 different from β 2 . We will now look at some empirical evidence for these parameter restrictions. Differences in the cost of training
We estimate training incidence and training intensity using the first six waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 1991-96. 12 We use data for men who were born after 1936, who provided complete information at each of the survey dates, were in full-time employment at the time of the survey, and not self-employed, in the armed forces or farmers. This gives a sample with 950 men and 5700 person-year observations.
After controlling for age, experience, occupation, firm size and the rate of unemployment, there is a monotonic relationship between training incidence and highest educational attainment. Workers with O levels have about 8 percent higher probability of receiving training than workers with no qualification, while A-level workers and degree workers have 12 percent and 20 percent higher probabilities, respectively (see Table 2 ). The same results appeared when we looked at average training days per year (3.5, 6.3 and 8.9 days for O-levels, A-levels and degree workers, respectively). This evidence suggests that the cost of training relative to post-training productivity is falling in the level of education.
These results confirm, amongst others, those of Arulampalam and Booth (1998) . In the U.S., Mincer (1991) got similar results using PSID data for 1976 and 12 As in Booth, Francesconi and Zoega (1998). 1978, and so did Lillard and Tan (1986) using CPS and NLS data. This supports our explanation of inter-group unemployment differentials. 5700 (950) 5700 (950) Note: Other controls included in all regressions are: age, age squared, experience, experience squared, union coverage, living with a partner, London resident, firm size dummies (6), occupation dummies (4), cohort of entry in the labour market (3), industry dummies (9), average quit rate at two-digit industry level, and local unemployment to vacancy ratio. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. ** significant at 0.01 level.
The question remains why the cost of training may differ between education groups. The most obvious reason would be that education proxied for inherent learning abilities. An alternative reason can be found in Nelson and Phelps (1966) who raised the possibility that education represented an acquired ability to learn. 13 Mincer (1991) added the possibility that the better educated had better opportunities to finance the cost of human capital investment.
We conclude that the higher training costs of the less educated are likely to cause higher unemployment via a higher replacement ratio and a steeper tightness curve in our figure. If the less educated are expensive to train, their wages are lower (which is confirmed in our BHPS sample) and they have a larger (smaller) propensity to quit (get a job) at a given rate of unemployment. Only at a higher rate of unemployment is the steady-state level of tightness reached.
Differences in quit-and hiring behaviour
Our empirical estimates also suggest that the less educated are more likely to quit. To illustrate this relationship, we use the same sample of workers as before. In addition to the education variables, we include in our quit regressions: i) relative wages, i.e. own wages relative (measured in 1996 prices) to average wages in each of the four education groups; and ii) the unemployment rate by education group, 14 and the unemployment to vacancy ratio. 15 To minimise potential endogeneity problems, we use last period (rather than current) relative wages. The estimates and their robust standard errors are in the first column of the Table 3 .
After controlling for a large set of demographic, labour market and job characteristics, we detect a negative gradient between education levels and the probability of quitting a job. 16 Workers with O levels have the same quitting probability as workers with no qualification (our base category), while workers with at least Alevel qualifications have 8-11 percent lower probabilities of quitting than the base group. Voluntary firm separations are less likely to occur when the worker's wage is higher than the average wage of workers with the same schooling. This relationships is, however, not significant at the 0.05 level. There is instead a positive and significant association between the unemployment rate by education group and the probability of quitting: a 1 percent increase in education-specific unemployment leads to a 0.7 percent increase in the quit rate. This does not mean that quits are countercyclical, but it reflects a higher quitting propensity for some educational groups when workers in the same group experience, on average, a higher unemployment. In fact, it should be noted that when the local unemployment to vacancy ratio, our proxy measure for business cycle conditions, increases by 10 units (approximately one standard deviation), the probability of quitting significantly decreases by 1 percent. This is in line with the empirical regularity that quits are procyclical (McLaughlin, 1991) . 
Note: Other controls included in the quits regression are: experience, experience squared, union coverage, living with a partner, London resident, firm size dummies (6), occupation dummies (4), cohort of entry in the labour market (3), travel to work time dummies (3), industry dummies (9), and local unemployment to vacancy ratio. Other controls included in first-hires regression are: age, age squared, race dummies (4), and parental occupation dummies (9). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. ** significant at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level.
We conclude that quits are falling in the level of education at a given rate of employment either because of differences in the autonomous quit rate, α, and/or in the replacement ratio. We do not have individual-specific replacement ratios and for that reason cannot distinguish between these two hypothesis. Calculation of such replacement ratios is problematic since personal circumstances and place of residence affect benefits received.
We also estimated the equation using layoffs instead of quits. 17 The results were qualitatively identical. Workers with A levels or a degree were significantly less likely to be laid off than those with O levels or no qualifications. Again, there was little difference between those with A levels and those with a degree.
These results conform with studies using American data. Both Mincer (1991) and Ashenfelter and Ham (1979) find that differences across education groups in the incidence of unemployment are more important than differences in the duration of unemployment spells. For example, Mincer finds that the bottom education group has a 70% higher probability of job separation than the top group and a 60% higher probability that the separation leads to an unemployment spell. As a result, the bottom group faces a 170% higher probability of becoming unemployed.
To study the relationship between hiring and education, we performed a similar analysis on a sample of 414 young men, drawn from the BHPS, who left full-time education between 1991 and 1996. 18 After controlling for individual and parental characteristics, we find that young men with higher educational attainments have a significantly lower probability of getting their first job (second column of Table 3 ).
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This may reflect the increasing turbulent nature of the British labour market in the 1990s. Furthermore, a 1 percent increase in the education-specific unemployment rate leads to a 12 percent reduction in the probability of entering work.
These results are not consistent with American data nor British data. This may be due to our limited sample that excludes previously employed workers. Mincer finds that the less educated have on average 26% longer duration of unemployment spells.
We would for this reason discount the importance of the parameter estimates in the hire equation.
Different responses in quit and hiring behaviour to wage and unemployment differentials
We now turn to our one remaining hypothesis regarding the slope of the hire-and the quit functions. The question is whether workers respond differently in their quit behaviour and first-hire behaviour to wage differentials and unemployment differentials depending on their education level. To address this question we interact our three education groups with both lagged relative wages and education-specific unemployment rates and separately estimate a quit regression and a hire regression.
The results are shown in the Table 4 .
We find that there is no difference in the way in which workers respond to wage differentials across education groups in their firm separation decisions. There is a tendency for better educated workers (with A levels or more) to leave their job if their wages are lower than the average wages earned by workers with similar educational levels. But this relationship is always poorly determined. Workers with at most O levels and, particularly, workers with degrees strongly respond to unemployment differentials within schooling group in their quitting behaviour: a 1 percent increase in education-specific unemployment leads to a 1.2 and 2.5 percent increase in the probability of quitting for the two education groups, respectively. Similarly, the transition into first job is marked by a higher sensitivity of better educated workers to education-specific unemployment (column 2). But is this explanation compatible with the evolution of the wage distribution?
A number of studies using U.S. and international data (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Davis, 1992) find that the lowest wages in the U.S. fell while the higher wages rose. This experience is shared by many other countries (Davis, 1992) 
III Conclusions
We have derived a model which explains differences in the natural rate of unemployment across education groups and claimed that the changing composition of the labour force across such groups could go some way towards explaining changes in total unemployment over time and across countries. Using BHPS data we have found:
• The cost of training workers is falling in education once we control for age, experience, union coverage, marriage status, place of residence, firm size, occupation, cohort of entry into the labour market, industry, average quit rate at two-digit industry level, and the local unemployment to vacancy ratio.
• The rate of turnover is falling in education when controlling for the same variables.
High training costseither caused by high turnover and a convex training technology or a high cost of training a given workerfor the less educated should, according to our model, reduce wages and raise (reduce) quits (hires) at a given level of unemployment and benefits. This causes the natural rate to be higher for the less educated. From our data we found that
• the quit rate was falling in education, again controlling for relative wages and the same variables as listed above.
This could be either because of the higher replacement ratiopossibly caused by a higher marginal training costor because of a higher autonomous quit rate α among the less educated.
We conjecture that the deterioration in wages and unemployment at the bottom of the skill distribution is compatible with rising relative training costs for the less educated following the introduction of new technology. This explanation explains the dual development of rising relative unemployment and falling relative wages among the less educated.
APPENDIX
We estimate the following equation where l i is the share of group i in the total labour force; l i = L i /L, and t is a time trend.
( ) ( ) Results from estimating equation (18) The coefficients for less than high school (line (1)), and less-than-high-school and high school together (line (5)), and college graduates (line (4)) are insignificant.
Similarly, all coefficients for the group 'some college' (line (3)) are insignificant. The only significant coefficient is for the high school group (line (2)). The rate of unemployment in this group is a decreasing function of the relative size of the lessthan-high-school group. However, the size of the coefficients is small: a 10% decrease in the share of the labour force in that group (1000 basis points) raises the withingroup unemployment rate among workers with a high-school degree by only about 0.1% or ten basis points. We conclude that the within-group rates are not affected by the upgrading as to make our inference from Chart 3 invalid. α ii
